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Regionalism in Eurasia: 
Explaining Authority Transfers to Regional Organizations
Ann-Sophie Gast
 
Abstract
Corresponding to the global proliferation of inter-state activities at the regional level since the end of 
the Cold War, Eurasia has experienced a surge of regional agreements and organizations. Since the dis-
solution of the Soviet Union, more than 29 regional organizations (ROs) with significant membership and 
agenda overlap have emerged. These organizations differ significantly in terms of institutional design. 
Organizations that were created in the 1990s and early 2000s display very limited or no pooling of author-
ity and low to moderate delegation. Regional organizations that were established during the past decade 
show pronounced delegation and median pooling. A mapping based on formal treaty analysis shows a 
general deepening of regional integration over time. It also reveals three phases of Eurasian regionalism 
with distinct integration dynamics and goals. Especially the third phase is surprising, as we do not only wit-
ness the increase of political authority of ROs, but also a more consequent implementation of agreements 
and the introduction of supranational elements. This deepening of regionalism is puzzling in light of 1) the 
rather recent independence of the Eurasian states and their colonial past under Russian domination, 2) the 
level of autocracy in the region, and 3) the presence of a regional hegemon, which has moreover recently 
experienced an authoritarian backlash. Relying on the concept of political authority, the first part of this 
paper gives an overview of the development of formal regional integration in Eurasia during the past 25 
years. The second part of the paper asks why Russia and the smaller Eurasian states go along with increas-
ing authority transfers to ROs. Based on a series of elite interviews conducted in Russian in February and 
March 2017, potential drivers of Eurasian regionalism are explained, with particular attention to Russian 
motives. The paper concludes with an outlook on avenues for future research.
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1. Introduction: Regionalism in Eurasia1
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a significant increase in interstate activities at the regional 
level (Börzel 2011). Both bilateral and multilateral regional agreements as well as regional organizations 
have proliferated. Since the mid-1980s, the number of regional organizations has grown from 42 to almost 
100 (CROP 2013: Dataset I; Jetschke/Theiner 2016: 2). Eurasia, too, has experienced a surge of regional 
activities. The region comprises the 15 newly independent states that emerged from the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) after its dissolution in December 1991,2 minus the three Baltic States. Since the 
dissolution of the USSR, more than 29 multilateral organizations with a regional focus came into existence 
in this part of the world. For a long time, however, Eurasian regionalism has been underestimated by com-
parative regionalism scholars due to the widespread belief that regional integration attempts in Eurasia 
were shallow and ineffective or merely Russian attempts to recreate the Soviet Union (Allison 2004, 2008; 
Collins 2009; Kubicek 2009; Wirminghaus 2012; Hancock/Libman 2016). The situation has changed at the 
latest with the signing of the Treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union in May 2014, which triggered contro-
versial interest, both within and outside the region. 
The empirical analysis of this paper is guided by the inductive question of how Eurasian regionalism, under-
stood as “state-led processes of building formal regional institutions and organizations” (Börzel/Risse 2016: 
7), has developed since the dissolution of the USSR. The focus of the analysis lies on formal regional integra-
tion as reflected by the transfer of political authority from member states to regional organizations. Relying 
on the concept of political authority, which allows to measure in how far member states as principals 
empower regional organizations as agents to govern in their name, the paper investigates changes in the 
institutional design of Eurasian regional organizations over time as well as emerging patterns of regional 
integration. It provides the first structured overview of formal regional integration in Eurasia during the 
past 25 years. The analysis is inspired by the cross-sectional dataset on international authority by Hooghe, 
Marks et al., which assesses the composition and decision-making rules of 72 international organizations 
from 1950 to 2010 (Hooghe et al. 2017), but so far only covers three post-Soviet organizations. 
Moreover, the paper seeks to understand why Russia and the small post-Soviet states started to increas-
ingly transfer authority to regional organizations, both in terms of pooling and delegation, and thereby 
gave up a certain degree of sovereignty. The empirical analysis shows that not only the quantity of regional 
organizations in Eurasia has increased over time, but also their quality. Changes in the Eurasian regional 
organizations are particularly apparent when distinguishing between pooling and delegation. While there 
was almost no pooling and delegation in the early Eurasian organizations, in some of the newer ones mem-
ber states delegate a significant degree of authority to independent bodies of the respective organization, 
1 This paper has been prepared for the KFG “The Transformative Power of Europe” Working Paper Series. The paper 
is a product of research and writing supported by the KFG as well as the Studienstiftung	des	deutschen	Volkes. 
During my field research in Russia, I was hosted by the School of International Relations at Saint Petersburg State 
University, which provided me with a space to work and valuable contacts. A special thanks goes to Nikolay Vlasov, 
who invited me to Saint Petersburg and facilitated my stay at the faculty. 
2 The region comprises the five Central Asian states Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan, 
the three Caucasian states Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan as well as the three Eastern European states Belarus, 
Moldova, and Ukraine and, finally, Russia, the official successor state of the Soviet Union. The terms newly inde-
pendent states and post-Soviet states will be used interchangeably throughout the paper.
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such as general secretariat, and pool authority to a certain extent in intergovernmental decision-making 
bodies. The newest organization, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU, 2015), even disposes of a suprana-
tional organ that is able to take decisions independent of member states’ interests. Furthermore, over the 
last decade, agreements such as the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (CU, 2010) and the 
Common Economic Space (CES, 2012) have been more thoroughly implemented than earlier agreements 
(Hancock/Libman 2016: 206). Finally, agreements have become more consequential for their signatories, 
as the most recently signed treaties do not allow for the simultaneous conclusion of deep and comprehen-
sive free trade agreements with the EU, thus compelling a choice between Eurasian or European integra-
tion. Overall, regional integration in Eurasia, whilst nowadays confined to a smaller circle of countries, has 
deepened over time. 
This development has not been anticipated by researchers and is puzzling in three respects. Firstly, it is 
puzzling given the fact that all post-Soviet states were formerly part of a single polity, the Soviet Union, 
and ever since its dissolution have been striving for sovereignty, autonomy, and dissociation from Russia. 
Secondly, it is puzzling given the dominance of autocratic and hybrid regimes in Eurasia,3 which are unlikely 
to conclude deep integration agreements and accept sovereignty restrictions by regional organizations. 
Thirdly, and most surprisingly, the deepening of Eurasian regionalism during the past decade coincides with 
an authoritarian backlash in Russia and an increasingly assertive Russian foreign policy under President 
Putin (Ambrosio 2016; Freedom House 2017b). While it is already puzzling that a regional hegemon binds 
itself to formal rules and gives up sovereignty, another central question is why Russia increasingly invests 
in multilateral regional organizations with intrusive institutional design while consolidating autocracy on 
the domestic level. Therefore, the second part of the paper discusses potential drivers of regional integra-
tion, paying particular attention to Russia’s role as the regional hegemon and agenda-setter. Based on the 
results of a series of elite interviews conducted in February and March 2017 in Russia, a causal narrative to 
explain the puzzle is developed.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the first part, I review the existing literature on regional integration 
in Eurasia, the emergence of regional organizations and the drivers of integration. Next, I introduce the 
Eurasian region, its characteristics and dynamics. In the second part, I explain the relevant concepts for 
the analysis of regional integration and introduce a model to measure the authority of regional organiza-
tions that was originally developed by Hooghe and Marks (Hooghe/Marks 2014; Hooghe et al. 2016). The 
empirical analysis examines how institutional design of regional organizations in Eurasia varies with regard 
to pooling and delegation of authority and maps all organizations along these two dimensions. In the final 
part of the paper, I summarize the results of the analysis, highlighting patterns and trends of Eurasian inte-
gration. Moreover, I outline a theoretical model to explain the Eurasian puzzle, proposing to open the black 
box of the state and study changes in ruling elites’ foreign policy preferences and motivations. Focusing on 
Russia’s role as the regional hegemon and agenda setter in Eurasia, I explain how counter alliance building 
and balancing can help to understand the rather untypical behavior of the regional hegemon in Eurasia. 
Last but not least, the paper concludes with an outlook on avenues for future research. 
3 According to the Polity IV data series (Marshall/Gurr/Jaggers 2016), Russia, Ukraine, and Armenia can be classi-
fied as anocracies, while Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus, and Azerbaijan are autocracies. 
Only Georgia, Moldova, and Kyrgyzstan are democracies, with scores slightly higher than six. However, the political 
situation has worsened in most of these countries since the last Polity IV data was published.
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2. Genesis and Institutional Design of Regional Organizations in the Literature
The literature has extensively addressed the question why post-Soviet states created regional organizations 
in the first place and has come up with several plausible theoretical arguments. Most scholars argue from 
a rationalist-functionalist perspective that the creation of regional organizations was initially motivated by 
the need to deal with common problems, interdependencies, and negative externalities, which arose partly 
as a consequence of the unplanned and quick collapse of the Soviet Union (Kubicek 2009; Obydenkova 
2011: 88; Libman/Vinokurov 2012: 868). The newly independent states saw regional organizations as tools 
to promote trade, curb economic development, and deal with the consequences of globalization. By in-
stitutionalizing cooperation at the regional level, states aimed to minimize uncertainty, transaction costs, 
and market failures (Dragneva/Wolczuk 2013). In line with the functional argumentation, Libman and 
Vinokurov define the interaction of functional bureaucracies and their ability to generate spillover effects 
as driving forces of regional integration (Libman/Vinokurov 2012). A more constructivist approach reckons 
that public demand driven by Soviet nostalgia, a feeling of solidarity, and persistent social ties between 
countries were crucial for the creation of regional organizations (Hancock/Libman 2016: 207). 
A classical realist perspective interprets Eurasian regionalism as Russia’s neo-imperial project to expand its 
sphere of influence and detain the post-Soviet states in its orbit of influence. US Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton even called Russian efforts to promote economic integration in Eurasia a “move to re-sovietize the 
region” (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2012). A neo-realist explanation underlines the importance of Russia 
as the regional hegemon in fostering and financing cooperation and providing benefits to other members on 
the one hand (Hancock 2009), and the interest of weaker states in reaping benefits from the powerful state on 
the other hand (Allison 2004). At the same time, regional organizations can also work as a form of alliance to 
balance powerful actors and counter threats to the region (Walt 1987). Along similar lines, some scholars argue 
that regional organizations in Eurasia mainly serve a regime-boosting purpose, meaning that member states 
exploit them to protect and legitimize their regimes and prevent regime changes (Allison 2008; Collins 2009; 
Söderbaum 2010). Focusing on autocracy promotion, Cameron and Orenstein maintain that regional organi-
zations provided additional linkages between Russia and the newly independent states offering Russia means 
to exert leverage in its neighboring countries in ways that contributed to the erosion of rights, liberties, and 
democracy (Cameron/Orenstein 2012: 39). Last but not least, diffusion scholars understand the emergence 
of regional organizations and their designs as the consequence of a global trend of increasing regionalism as 
states observe each other, learn from and emulate each other (Börzel/Risse 2009; Jetschke 2010; Risse 2016).
While there are many convincing arguments to explain the emergence of regional organizations in Eurasia, 
the deepening of regional integration in this region still poses a puzzle. Mainstream theoretical perspec-
tives in International Relations lack convincing rationales to account for the divergence of pooling and dele-
gation of authority and change of authority over time. Firstly, they face difficulties explaining the deepening 
of integration among autocratic states. While governments might have incentives to cooperate in order to 
lock-in autocratic rule and stabilize their regime, the literature assumes a reluctance of autocratic states to 
enter into intrusive integration agreements, since the latter can limit their freedom of maneuver as well as 
opportunities to provide rents to their supporters (Söderbaum 2004; Mansfield/Milner/Pevehouse 2008). 
The presence of a regional hegemon also presents a challenge to explaining the deepening of integration. 
When there is a strong regional hegemon, hegemonic stability theory predicts the prevalence of bilateral 
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and, in any case, intergovernmental agreements, in which the hegemon exploits power asymmetries with 
its neighbors (Krasner 1976; Gilpin 1987; Solingen 2008). Although hegemons can induce the creation of 
regional institutions and exert significant influence on their design (Gilpin 1987: 87-90), they are usually 
reluctant to bind themselves to formal rules and give up sovereignty themselves. Russia, however, gave up 
sovereignty in the EAEU with its supranational commission and equal voting rights for all members.
Neoliberal institutionalism does not fit the Eurasian case either as it tries to explain variations in institu-
tional designs of regional organizations with varying degrees of regional interdependence. High levels of re-
gional interdependence produce high levels of institutionalization and require more delegation (Keohane 
1984). In Eurasia, however, interdependence was highest when the USSR collapsed. At the same time, 
authority transfers to early regional organizations were very limited. The rationalist institutional design 
literature offers more useful arguments to explain differences in institutionalization at the regional level, 
assuming that states use international organizations to achieve their goals and design organizations ac-
cordingly. Koremenos et al. (2001) define five institutional design features (membership rules, scope of 
issues covered, centralization of tasks, rules of control, and flexibility) whose variation can be explained by 
variables such as distribution and enforcement problems, number of actors as well as uncertainty about 
behavior, the state of the world, and preferences. While this approach is certainly very useful, it is also 
very technical and fails to identify key actors and their foreign policy interests and motivations. Moreover, 
it cannot account for identity changes of foreign policy actors that might consequently lead to shifts in 
foreign policy preferences and strategies at the regional level. Last but not least, some of the independent 
variables are in practice very difficult to observe. 
Constructivism assumes that institutional design reflects cultural and bureaucratic traditions as well as 
domestically rooted norms and political cultures (Solingen 2008; Acharya/Johnston 2007). Acharya and 
Johnston, for example, argue that democratic regimes are more likely to accept authority transfers to re-
gional organizations than autocratic regimes, because elites in democracies are more familiar with pow-
er-sharing mechanisms from their domestic context (Acharya/Johnston 2007: 262). Another constructivist 
argument emphasizes norms and identity. Katzenstein (2005) maintains that states in some regions have 
cultural predispositions towards consensus-building, thin institutionalization, and informal structures. 
Those arguments, however, cannot explain change over time either as cultural predispositions, bureau-
cratic traditions, and regime type have remained mostly unchanged in the concerned states. 
Diffusion approaches assume that institutional design of regional organizations does not evolve inde-
pendently, but is influenced and shaped by other organizations within or outside the region via processes 
of learning or emulation (Jetschke/Theiner 2016). In particular, the EU serves as a global blueprint for re-
gional organizations worldwide (Lenz/Marks 2016: 522; Acharya 2016). Even though regional institutional 
design in Eurasia was clearly inspired by EU structures and institutions, the diffusion perspective faces diffi-
culties explaining why it took the states of the region more than 15 years to deepen integration significantly. 
To understand the Eurasian context better, the next section is therefore devoted to introducing the region, 
its specifics and characteristics. While comparison between regions is often very useful, the Eurasian re-
gion disposes of some unique features that have to be understood and considered when trying to explain 
the development of regionalism and the deepening of integration since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
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3. Introducing the Regional Setting: Eurasia – a Region in Motion
While this paper theoretically can be located in the field of comparative regionalism and the study of 
regional organizations, it is empirically confined to one region, namely Eurasia. Eurasia refers to the region 
constituted by the former republics of the Soviet Union minus the three Baltic states: Russia, the official 
successor state of the USSR, the five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan), the three Caucasian states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) and the three Eastern 
European states (Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine) (Qoraboyev 2010; Laruelle 2015; Hancock/Libman 2016). 
Unlike “post-Soviet space,” the term Eurasia, which refers to the geographic location of the region between 
Europe and Asia, does not per se carry any political connotation, which is why I prefer to use this term 
instead of post-Soviet. Also the states of the region themselves have started to use “Eurasia” and “Eurasian” 
more frequently to describe themselves without referring to the Soviet legacy, which is reflected in aca-
demic publications, newspaper articles, but also in the naming of regional organizations and institutions 
(Pryce 2013; Laruelle 2015; Hancock/Libman 2016; Vinokurov 2017). 
For the past 25 years Eurasia has been undergoing geopolitical changes, experiencing conflicts and even 
wars, the interference of different external actors and the formation and dissolution of different regional 
sub-groupings. Since the collapse of the USSR, Eurasia has been characterized by transition and constant 
transformation, leading to parallel dynamics of conflict and fragmentation on the one hand, and coopera-
tion and interdependencies on the other hand. Several former Soviet republics have sought to deflect their 
colonial past under Russian domination. The Baltic states, for example, invested a significant effort in dis-
tancing themselves from their previous regional belonging and in (re-) constructing their European identity. 
Since their accession to the EU and NATO in 2004, they have been considered as part of the European re-
gional complex (Hancock/Libman 2016: 203). Ukraine was lingering between Europe and Eurasia for many 
years, but – at the latest since the Russian annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine – turned its 
back on the Eurasian regional project (Litra 2016). Georgia has also been pursuing a strictly pro-European 
agenda since the five-day war with Russia in 2008 and has left all Eurasian regional organizations and free 
trade agreements (Kuchins et al. 2016).
Many of the other post-Soviet states conceive and actively promote themselves as part of two or more 
regions (Buzan/Waever 2003: 398; Markedonov 2009). While Belarus uncompromisingly chose Eurasia, 
Moldova remains divided between Europe and Eurasia, between further integration with the EU or closer 
relations with the EAEU (Rumer 2017). Some of the Central Asian states see themselves not only as part 
of Eurasia, but at the same time as part of a genuine Central Asian region, the Black Sea region, the Turkic 
community as well as the broader West and South Asian region. However, the Central Asians failed to cre-
ate lasting exclusive Central Asian formats at state level due to numerous tensions, conflicts, and personal 
hostilities (Allison 2004, 2008; Collins 2009; Qoraboyev 2010). The Caucasian sub-region remains highly 
divided due to the ongoing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Georgia’s struggle to move closer 
to the EU (Bolgova 2017). Furthermore, there are adjacent countries with stakes in Eurasia such as China, 
which is a member state of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and has been investing heavily 
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in its Silk Road initiative,4 or Mongolia and Afghanistan, which were not part of the USSR but share large 
borders with the region and are associate members of some Eurasian regional organizations. 
Unique in comparison to other world regions, Eurasia’s constituent states have once formed a single state 
for almost 70 years. The starting point of regional integration is usually the absence or low levels of regional 
interaction and the desire to intensify exchange. In Eurasia, regional integration started the other way 
round, namely from high levels of interaction when the states formed a single polity to the collapse of that 
polity and subsequent disintegration (Libman/Vinokurov 2012: 868). After the official dissolution of the 
USSR on December 26, 1991, two parallel developments of integration and disintegration set in. One the 
one hand, the need to dismantle the Soviet Union peacefully and deal with persisting economic, infrastruc-
tural, and cultural links and interdependencies led to the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), a regional organization with the goal of “economic and political integration without the com-
munist ideology” (Hancock/Libman 2016: 203). On the other hand, the newly independent states began 
to engage in nation-building and the creation of a distinct national identity and narrative, which in almost 
all cases implied a strong focus on norms such as sovereignty and non-interference as well as a process of 
dissociation from Russia. Thus, on the one hand, the post-Soviet states were forced to continue coopera-
tion in order to deal with common problems, interdependencies, and negative externalities resulting from 
their past. On the other hand, they were keen to disintegrate the structures of the USSR, decrease their 
dependence on Russia, develop their own national identities, and diversify their foreign relations. 
Another defining characteristic of the Eurasian region is the presence of a hegemon that pursues an as-
sertive, if not aggressive, foreign policy towards its neighbors. Russia is by far the most powerful player in 
Eurasia with a large nuclear arsenal and a GDP of $ 1.331 trillion in 2015, which is more than seven times as 
big as the GDP of the second strongest Eurasian state in economic terms, Kazakhstan (GDP = $ 184.38 bil-
lion in 2015; World Bank 2016). Overall, the Russian economy accounts for 2.14 percent of the world econ-
omy, but for approximately 76 percent of the regional GDP (Hancock/Libman 2016: 207; World Bank 2014). 
A prominent tool in Russia’s foreign policy is destabilization. In the past years, Russia supported separatist 
movements in Georgia, Moldova, and, most recently, in Eastern Ukraine, annexed Crimea, and provided 
both Azerbaijan and Armenia with weapons in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, Russia 
bluntly uses its energy leverage as a foreign policy tool to blackmail its neighbors. Despite its assertive for-
eign policy towards its so-called “near abroad,” Russia actively promotes multilateral regionalism and has 
been initiating and sponsoring most of the numerous regional organizations that have emerged during the 
past 20 years. In the 2016 Russian Foreign Policy Concept, regional integration is conceptualized as a tool to 
“strengthen competitiveness, security, and financial and economic stability” (MFA of the Russian Federation 
2016). To reinforce the Eurasian integration process, to expand the Eurasian Economic Union and develop 
multilateral cooperation with the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States are priority 
foreign policy goals for Russia (MFA of the Russian Federation 2016).  
4 The Silk Road initiative, also called „One Belt, One Road“ (OBOR), is a development and infrastructure strategy by 
China to connect China with Eurasia and the European continent through roads, railroads, pipelines, and ports 
along the old trade route through Central Asia. 
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Last but not least, Eurasia is one of the most autocratic regions in the world (Swedberg/Sprout 2008), as 
most of the Eurasian states are non-democratic with several of them residing in the group of the most 
autocratic regimes worldwide (Freedom House 2017a).5 While Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, and 
Kyrgyzstan are ranked as partly free, Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan belong to the group of the 
most repressive states worldwide. Moreover, during the past years some post-Soviet states have expe-
rienced authoritarian backlashes as shown by impaired ratings. Especially Russia has moved away from 
democracy under the Putin administration, reflected by the centralization of power, the erosion of civil 
and political liberties, and increasing state control over the economy and the media (Ambrosio 2016: 4f). 
However, despite an overall increase of autocracy in Eurasia, multilateral cooperation and regional integra-
tion gained new momentum among post-Soviet states during the past decade.
4. Studying Regional Organizations: Institutional Design and Authority Transfers
Regions are a “fundamental, even driving force of world politics” (Fawn 2009: 5), as they structure inter-
national affairs and cut across every dimension in the study of International Relations (Katzenstein 2005). 
Located between the national and the global level, regions constitute rather subjective categories. There 
is no uniform definition of what a region is, the only common denominator of all extant definitions is that 
regions contain more than two countries that are geographically close. Next to geographical proximity, 
many scholars define regions based on tangible criteria and common features, such as economic interde-
pendence; social, linguistic, and cultural homogeneity; historical and political bonds; or religion (Russett 
1967; Cantori/Spiegel 1970). However, regions are often contested and subject to changes, interpretations, 
and manipulations. Also, certain areas of the world can belong to different regions. I therefore find it 
more suitable to understand regions as political constructions that refer to territorial location and to geo-
graphical or normative contiguity (Börzel/Risse 2016: 7), and treat them as products of culture, economics, 
history, and politics (Katzenstein 1997: 2, 9). Eurasia, for example, is a highly contested region, which not 
only has several designations, e.g. the post-Soviet space, newly independent states, or the CIS region, but 
also includes sometimes more, sometimes fewer countries. 
Studying regional organizations is at the core of comparative regionalism, a growing field of study dedi-
cated to the comparative analysis of regional cooperation and integration and regional order in and beyond 
Europe. This research agenda, which has emerged during the past 25 years, reflects a worldwide phenom-
enon, namely the steady increase of intra- and cross-regional activities and the proliferation of regional 
organizations. Regionalism is also a concept within the discipline of International Relations, which can be 
defined as “state-led processes of building and sustaining formal regional institutions and organizations 
among at least three states” (Börzel/Risse 2016: 7). This definition conceptualizes regionalism as a top-
down, state-induced process of region-building, which entails the creation of formal institutions as well 
as their empowerment. Regional organizations, which are a type of institutionalized cooperation “among 
5 Freedom House uses a scale of 1 (the most free) to 7 (the least free) to evaluate civil liberties and political rights 
worldwide. Countries can be placed into three categories according to their average combined score: 1.0 – 2.5 = 
free, 3.0 – 5.0 = partly free, 5.5 – 7 = not free. 
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three or more countries within a geographic space” (Jetschke/Lenz 2013: 626), are thus central to the study 
of regionalism as they are the most visible outcomes of state-led processes of region- and institution-build-
ing, representing valuable indicators of states’ willingness to cooperate and integrate. Regional organiza-
tions, however, differ a lot with regard to their purpose, membership, and institutional design (Lenz/Marks 
2016). Especially the degree of autonomy from member states’ control varies starkly. 
4.1	 Authority	 Transfers	 from	Member	 States	 to	 the	 Regional	 Level:	 The	 Institutional	
Design	of	Regional	Organizations
In this paper, I am focusing on authority transfers from member states to regional organizations as reflected 
by their institutional design, arguing that it represents an important benchmark for the depth of regional in-
tegration. Institutional design describes the “set of institutions governing political decision-making” within 
the organization (Weingast 1995: 2) and is represented by the institutions, rules and policies mentioned 
in the regional organizations’ founding and amending agreements. An organization’s design reflects which 
governance competences states are willing to delegate to regional bodies, how much sovereignty they are 
willing to give up, and which policy domains they are keen to negotiate jointly at the regional level. I am 
especially interested in how far member states empower regional organizations to fulfill state functions, 
such as solving collective action problems or providing common goods.  
Even though there can be a vast difference between the legal framework defining how the organization 
should function and the functioning of the organization in practice, the question of why an organization 
is designed in a certain way is important. Robust institutional design that grants regional organizations 
authority and thus power and agency is the formal basis for effective organizations. It reflects which 
governance functions are delegated to regional bodies. Furthermore, there are significant differences 
among organizations, even within the same region, as the Eurasian case shows. The founding treaty of the 
EAEU, for instance, comprises more than 800 pages and is extremely precise with regard to rules, rights, 
and obligations of member states. Other founding treaties are mere eight pages long and leave plenty of 
room for interpretation. The question is thus not only why states bother writing detailed and ambitious 
agreements since negotiating them involves significantly more costs than negotiating shallow ones, but 
also why institutional designs of regional organizations within a region comprising more or less the same 
member states can differ so much. 
There are several ways to study the institutional design of multilateral organizations. By assessing orga-
nizations’ institutional similarities and convergences, it is possible to trace diffusion processes between 
them (Jetschke/Theiner 2016). Other options are to evaluate organizations’ degree of institutionalization, 
measured by the frequency of meetings, the level of centralization and membership rules (Haftel 2007, 
2013) or to define organizations’ degree of legalization, operationalized as precision, obligation, and dele-
gation (Abbott et al. 2000). I am, however, mostly interested in how far member states empower regional 
organizations to govern in their name. To capture state-like functions of regional organizations and thus 
the degree of formal regional integration, political authority is the most useful concept. It allows to mea-
sure what kind of rights member states transfer to regional organizations, in which field of actions they 
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empower them to act independently, and on which terms they want to cooperate with the other member 
states. Political authority comes close to what Weber named legal authority, which is based on rational 
grounds and embodied in a system of impersonal rules that are contractually established and legally en-
acted in accordance with known and recognized principles (Weber 1922). Political authority thus differs 
from charismatic and traditional authority, the first one relying on the charisma or appeal of a leader and 
his extraordinary qualities, and the second one resting on the belief in the sanctity of traditions and the 
heredity of power. 
Political authority is a distinct form of power, describing the capacity to make binding and legitimate deci-
sions for a collectivity (Lake 2010: 592), which is at the core of governance. In general, authority describes 
a relation in which actor A claims authority and actor B recognizes actor A’s claim to authority as legitimate 
(Lake 2010; Zürn 2012). It does not necessarily rely on absolute compliance, but rather on the general ac-
ceptance of the rules concerning non-compliance. Authority differs from other forms of social power such 
as force, coercion, persuasion, or argumentation in the sense that obedience is voluntary, based on the 
belief that the actor possessing authority can claim the legitimacy and competence to exert it. Authority 
rests on a social contract that exchanges political order for compliance by the governed (Lake 2010: 596). 
Authority is not confined to the state, but can also reside with Non-Governmental Organizations, transna-
tional firms, or international organizations (Cutler et al. 1999; Lake 2010: 590). In the latter case, member 
states transfer authority to organizations that promise order in international governance in exchange for 
restriction of state sovereignty (Kahler/Lake 2009: 247; Lake 2010; Hooghe/Marks 2014). Political authority 
has to be distinguished from expert or epistemic authority, which refers to the capacity to make compe-
tent statements, judgments, assessments, and recommendation based on knowledge and relies on the 
recognition of competence and expertise of an actor or institution (Simmerl/Zürn 2016; Busch/Liese 2017). 
4.2	Dimensions	of	Authority	Transfers:	Pooling	and	Delegation	and	Why	It	Is	Important	
to	Distinguish	between	Them
According to the degree and level of authority transfers from member states, regional institution-building 
processes can be placed on a continuum ranging from intergovernmental cooperation to regional inte-
gration. The latter involves supranational elements as states shift political authority to collective bodies 
that can make binding or authoritative decisions for their members (Lindberg 1963; Kahler/Lake 2009: 
246; Börzel 2011). In intergovernmental cooperation, states retain their veto right in decision-making, 
meaning that they reserve their option to block any proposal by other parties and thus do not give up 
sovereignty. When member states shift authority to collective bodies, for example by waiving their veto in 
decision-making, by enabling bodies to implement policies, or by establishing independent dispute settle-
ment bodies, organizations move towards supranationalism (Lenz/Marks 2016: 514). Generally, states are 
reluctant to delegate comprehensive political authority to regional organizations, but they often agree to 
formalize decision-making processes, establish dispute-settlement procedures, or create secretariats with 
wide-ranging competencies (Börzel 2011: 13). 
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There are two conceptually, logically, and empirically distinct modes of authority transfer to international 
organizations: pooling and delegation. Pooling characterizes joint decision-making among the states them-
selves, whereby authority is transferred from individual member states to a collective intergovernmental 
body of the organization, in which member states directly participate, but give up their capacity to block 
decisions and to control the body (Keohane/Hoffmann 1991: 7). Pooling comprises formal rules about joint 
decision-making procedures, the procedure by which decisions are ratified and the extent to which they 
are binding (Hooghe/Marks 2014: 307). Its main purpose is to enhance efficiency of the organization and to 
reduce blockades in decision-making (Hooghe/Marks 2014: 317). Delegation describes a conditional grant 
of authority by member states to an independent body of the organization, such as the general secretariat, 
enabling it to fill in or decide about the practical details of incomplete contracts and to perform certain 
limited tasks (Kahler/Lake 2009: 246; Hooghe/Marks 2014: 309). Delegation helps to reduce the transac-
tion costs of decision-making, provides information to all member states, avoids issue cycling, and sustains 
credible commitments (Hooghe/Marks 2014: 309f). 
The degree to which states are willing to delegate or to pool authority differs significantly. In their mapping of 
72 international organizations, Hooghe and Marks found out that pooling and delegation vary independently 
as they involve different trade-offs: pooling can lead to a de facto loss of sovereignty as member states forgo 
their veto right and accept the risk of being outvoted by the other member states, while delegation implies 
the empowerment of an independent body that could pursue its own agenda independent of member 
states’ interests (Hooghe/Marks 2014: 310). It is therefore crucial to distinguish between these two dimen-
sions when assessing the authority of regional organizations. Authority of regional organizations is codified 
and institutionalized through rules that are established in contracts, in which states voluntarily agree to bind 
themselves to a set of formal rules to facilitate cooperation (Hooghe/Marks 2014, Lenz et. al 2014).
5. Empirical Analysis: Regional Organizations in Eurasia and Their Political Authority
There is a broad variety of regional organizations in Eurasia with overlapping agendas and membership. The 
first regional organization emerged immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS), which was meant to limit the costs of disintegration and ensure a “civilized 
divorce” of the former member states of the USSR, was created in December 1991 at the same meeting 
where the presidents of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus agreed on the dissolution of the USSR (Hancock/
Libman 2016: 206; Vinokurov 2017: 56). At the beginning of the 2000s, three major post-Soviet regional 
organizations emerged. The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), which was recently merged with 
the newest regional project, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), was founded in 2000. In 2001, the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) comprising Russia, four Central Asian states, and China6 was cre-
ated, and one year later, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a security and defense alliance 
between Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, came into existence. The newest 
addition to the spaghetti bowl of regional organizations in Eurasia is the EAEU, which started working at 
6 The SCO used to comprise Russia, China, and all Central Asian States except for Turkmenistan. At a recent SCO 
summit in June 2017 in Astana, Pakistan and India joined the organization. 
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the beginning of 2015. The EAEU is a comprehensive economic union with an institutional design closely 
resembling the European Union and developed out of the Eurasian Customs Union (2010) and the Single 
Economic Space (2012).
Overall, more than 29 regional organizations have been established in Eurasia since 1991, but not all of 
them are relevant for the analysis of post-Soviet integration.7 Some organizations have a very broad mem-
bership including states from adjacent regions, others are administered by international organizations, 
such as the UN or the EU. The following criteria should therefore ensure that regional organizations that 
are included in the analysis of pooling and delegation of authority match my research interests:
• they have been established by at least two contiguous states that define their membership on a re-
gional basis,
• they are sufficiently institutionalized in terms of regular meetings and written rules governing 
decision-making,
• they are not administered by other international organizations, 
• the large majority of member states (two thirds) are post-Soviet states.
This definition understands regional organizations as multilateral international organizations with a region-
ally defined membership, which is reflected by the first criterion. In contrast to international organizations, 
regional organizations are created and empowered by geographically proximate states that want to “de-
velop their common belonging to a geographical space” (Laruelle/Peyrouse 2012: 5). The second criterion 
excludes “zombie” organizations that only exist on paper but in fact do not meet nor produce any policy 
outcomes. Moreover, it ensures that there is a basis for analysis, as the evaluation of political authority 
relies on codified and institutionalized rules. The third criterion aims to exclude organizations that were ini-
tiated and are administered by international organizations, such as the UN or the EU. Organizations that are 
not run by member states themselves but by external actors do not constitute genuine regional projects 
that allow for conclusions about member states’ preferences and interests regarding regional governance. 
Last but not least, due to the regionally confined focus of my analysis, the fourth criterion requires a two-
thirds majority of post-Soviet member states to guarantee that regional organizations are not dominated 
by the interests of actors external to the region. The threshold of a two-thirds majority allows to capture 
the volatility of the Eurasian region as neighboring states can be included in regional organizations.
This definition leaves me with 14 regional organizations for analysis that were established between 1991 
and 2015 and are in equal parts multi-purpose and task-specific. The smallest organization in terms of 
membership has two member states, while the largest has 13 members. The overview reveals that the 
majority of regional organizations in Eurasia deal with economic and/or security issues. While the main 
economic goals are to enhance trade between member states and to curb economic development of the 
region, in the security realm organizations aim to fight terrorism, separatism, and extremism (as in the SCO) 
7 A complete list of all regional organizations in Eurasia can be found in Annex 2. 
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or to create a common defense alliance (as in the CSTO). Further issue areas covered by regional organi-
zation are finance, transport and infrastructure, cultural affairs, and political cooperation. The selected 14 
organizations are analyzed in more detail in the next section. 
Table 1: Overview of regional organizations in Eurasia that will be included in the analysis of authority
Name of 
Organization 
Year of 
Establishment 
Member States Main Issue Areas Purpose 
Eurasian / Post-Soviet Organizations 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
(CIS) 
1991 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Moldova, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
Economy, security, 
political affairs 
Multi-purpose 
Union State of 
Belarus and Russia
2000 Belarus, Russia
Economy, security, 
political affairs, 
cultural and societal 
affairs, etc.
Multi-purpose
Eurasian Economic
Community 
(EurAsEC) 
2000 - 2014 
(merged with EAEU 
in 2015) 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan 
Economy 
 
Multi-purpose 
Shanghai 
Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) 
2001 (successor of 
Shanghai Five 1996) 
China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia, 
Uzbekistan 
Mainly security, but 
also trade, border 
management, politics, 
tourism, etc. 
Task-specific 
Collective Security 
Treaty Organization 
(CSTO) 
2002 (originated 
from Collective 
Security Treaty 
1992) 
Armenia, Belarus, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan  
Security Task-specific 
Eurasian 
Development Bank 
(EDB) 
2006 
Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia, Tajikistan 
Finance, research on 
regional integration 
Task-specific 
Eurasian Customs 
Union (CU)  
2010 (successor of 
CES, merged with 
EAEU in 2015) 
Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia 
Economy Task-specific 
Common Economic 
Space (CES) 
2012 (developed 
out of CU, merged 
with EAEU in 2015) 
Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia 
Economy Task-specific 
Eurasian Economic 
Union (EAEU) 
2015 (successor of 
EurAsEC, CU and 
CES) 
Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia 
Economy, transport, 
energy, agriculture
Multi-purpose 
Eurasian Organizations created to promote integration without Russia 
GUAM Organization 
for Democracy 
and Economic 
Development 
1997 (2001, 2006) 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Moldova, Ukraine 
(Uzbekistan 1999-2002) 
Security, economy,
Energy, democracy 
promotion, European 
integration 
Multi-purpose 
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Central Asian Organizations 
International Fund 
for Saving the Aral 
Sea (IFAS)  
1993 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan 
Environment, water 
management 
Task-specific 
Turkic Organizations 
The Cooperation 
Council of Turkic 
Speaking States 
(Turkic Council) 
2009 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkey 
Culture, economy Multi-purpose 
Asian Organizations 
Economic 
Cooperation 
Organization (ECO) 
1985/1992 
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, 
Pakistan, Turkey, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
Economy, energy, 
transport 
Multi-purpose 
 
European Organizations 
Intergovernmental 
Commission 
Transport Corridor 
Europe-Caucasus-
Asia (IGC TRACECA) 
1998 (developed 
out of TRACECA 
1993) 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Iran, 
Moldova, Romania, Turkey, 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan 
Economy, transport Multi-purpose 
Source: Own illustration.
6. Mapping Regional Organizations in Eurasia: Patterns and Trends
To study and map the evolution of Eurasian regionalism, and particularly the development of regional 
authority, I analyze Eurasian regional organizations and their institutional design applying text analysis. The 
information for interpreting the authority of regional organizations in Eurasia is extracted from primary 
sources such as founding treaties, amending treaties, annexes, conventions, charters, or rules of proce-
dures of regional organizations. The main focus is on formal rules, but to narrow the gap between intention 
and actual practice, the translation of formal rules into institutions is also investigated. All in all, more than 
35 treaties, most of them in Russian, were coded and analyzed for this paper.8 
6.1	 Operationalizing	 Authority	 Transfers	 to	 Regional	 Organizations:	 Pooling	 and	
Delegation
Departing from a model to assess authority in international organizations developed by Hooghe et al. 
(Hooghe/Marks 2014; Lenz et. al 2014; Lenz/Marks 2016; Hooghe et al. 2017), I operationalize authority 
8 Often, rules of procedure, rules for decision-making procedures, and competencies of delegated bodies are de-
fined not in the founding treaty but in separate documents, such as rules of procedures, charters, or amending 
treaties of RO bodies.
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transfers to regional organizations as 1) pooling of authority in the highest intergovernmental body and 
2) delegation of authority to an independent body across several decision areas. Pooling of authority cap-
tures decision-making rules of regional organizations and is measured in the highest intergovernmental 
body with regard to voting rules, bindingness of decisions, and ratification procedures at the stage of final 
decision-making. States can take decisions by unanimity or consensus, by supermajority, and by simple 
or absolute majority. They can be nonbinding, partially binding, or binding. Last but not least, sometimes 
decisions have to be ratified by all or by some member states in order to come into effect. Consequently, 
states have a variety of options at their disposal when designing decision-making rules. 
As the sovereignty loss is highest when member states waive their right to veto by agreeing to majority voting 
and thereby accepting the risk of being outvoted by others, the score for voting rules counts double and is thus 
multiplied by two, while the scores for bindingness and ratification are just counted once. Hence, the maxi-
mum score of 4 is reached when the highest intergovernmental bodies of regional organizations take binding 
decisions that do not require ratification, by simple majority voting. The minimum score of 0 is reached when 
they take nonbinding decisions by unanimity or consensus that only enter into force after ratification by all 
members. In the latter case, member states retain complete control over the decision-making process. 
Table 2: Operationalization of Authority Transfers
Authority 
Dimension
What It Means Trade-off Operationalization Measurement
Pooling
Joint decision-
making among 
states in 
intergovernmental 
bodies of RO
Loss of veto/
sovereignty: 
member states 
can be outvoted
Voting rules, 
ratification 
procedures and 
bindingness 
of decisions 
in the highest 
intergovernmental 
body of RO
Summated rating 
scale from 0 (no 
pooling) to 4 
(maximum pooling)
Delegation
Conditional grant 
of authority by 
member states to an 
independent body 
of the RO
Loss of 
sovereignty: 
Member states 
empower third 
actor
Delegation of 
authority to 
secretariat in 11 
decision areas
Summated rating 
scale from 0 (no 
delegation) to 
11 (maximum 
delegation)
Source: Own illustration, based on conceptual distinction by Kahler/Lake 2009 and Hooghe/Marks 2014.
Delegation captures the existence of a delegated body and measures authority transfers by member states 
to general secretariats or executive committees that fulfill the role of a secretariat, in ten decision areas, 
such as membership accession or suspension, policy initiation, or budget drafting.9 Delegated bodies are 
still under member states’ ultimate control, but they often enjoy autonomy to fill in the details of incom-
plete contracts, provide expertise, or propose policy initiatives. At the upper end of the delegation scale, 
some secretariats can even make binding decisions or punish non-compliance. Delegation is calculated as 
9 An overview of all eleven decision areas as well as the detailed operationalization for both dimensions of authority 
transfer can be found in Annex 1. 
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a summated rating scale ranging from 0 (no delegation) to 11 (maximum delegation). Member states can 
also delegate authority to other independent bodies of regional organizations, such as consultative bodies, 
parliamentary assemblies, or judicial bodies, but in this paper, I am only analyzing delegation to secretariats 
or executive committees that function as secretariats. Both numeric indicators for pooling and delegation 
are transformed into qualitative indicators, indicating high, medium, or low levels of pooling or delegation.10
6.2	Authority	of	Regional	Organizations	in	Eurasia
The mapping of Eurasian regional organizations and their authority shows some surprising results (see 
Table 3 below). Contrary to the assumptions formulated by most theories of regional cooperation and 
integration, there is a significant divergence of pooling and delegation across time and organizations. While 
organizations that were founded in the 1990s and early 2000s display a rather low level of authority, some 
of the newer organizations score almost double as high on both pooling and delegation. There is not much 
change of authority within organizations over time, with regional institutional design in Eurasia proving to 
be rather static. The only organization whose design has changed over time is the EAEU, which developed 
out of the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space. Both predecessor agreements already provided 
for a permanent non-state organ, the Eurasian Economic Commission, which also became the central organ 
of the EAEU. The Commission developed from a purely intergovernmental to a supranational organ that is 
now able to make binding regulatory decisions on matters relating to member states’ domestic jurisdiction. 
Overall, there is a wide variation of pooling as some organizations reach medium to high scores between 1.5 
and 3.5, while others do not pool at all. Several of the highest intergovernmental bodies take binding decisions 
that do not require ratification, but only the Eurasian Development Bank’s (EDB) Council takes decision by su-
permajority or simple majority, depending on the matter. The EDB is therefore the only organization in Eurasia 
in which member states waived their right to veto in the highest intergovernmental body. The same variation 
can be found with regard to delegation, where organizations reach scores between 1 and 7. Approximately 
two thirds of the analyzed organizations dispose of secretariats with low to medium authority, reaching scores 
between 1 and 4.5. Four of the analyzed secretariats/executive committees are equipped with more compre-
hensive competences and are able to perform tasks beyond infrastructural and administrative support, such 
as to draft the annual budget, recruit staff or initiate and draft policies. Overall, delegation is more pronounced 
than pooling: in most Eurasian organizations member states take decisions in the highest intergovernmental 
body by consensus and thus preserve their veto power. By contrast, several secretariats dispose of wide-reach-
ing competences. In this regard, regional authority in Eurasia corresponds to a global trend, according to which 
pooling decision-making is the exception rather than the rule as opposed to increasing levels of delegation in 
regional organizations worldwide (Lenz et al. 2014; Hooghe/Marks 2014; Lenz/Marks 2016).
Given the sample size of 14 regional organizations, it is difficult to establish an explicit temporal trend. 
However, the mapping reveals a gradual deepening of formal regional integration over time, which started 
to gain momentum in 2006 with the creation of the EDB. Regional organizations that were created in the 
10 The numeric indicators and the transformation details can be found in Annex 1.
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1990s and early 2000s display rather low levels of pooling with scores between 0 and 2 and low to medium 
levels of delegation with scores between 1 and 4.5. The CIS, the very first regional organization, and IGC 
TRACECA, an organization that was initiated by the EU but is now run by the member states themselves, 
represent exceptions in this group of ROs as they score higher on delegation. Moreover, membership in 
the early years of Eurasian regionalism varies a lot as some organizations consist of 13 member states (IGC 
TRACECA), while others have only four members (GUAM). Regional organizations that were created after 
2005 demonstrate both more pronounced delegation with medium to high scores between 4 and 7 and 
higher levels of pooling with scores between 1.5 and 3.5. The Turkic Council is an exception among the 
younger organizations, displaying the weakest institutional design of all analyzed regional organizations. 
Overall, membership is smaller and more stable with four to six member states on average. 
Table 3: Analysis of Authority of Eurasian ROs
Name of 
RO
Founding 
Year Member States 
Initiating/ 
Founding States
Scope of 
Integration
Authority 
Pooling
Authority 
Delegation
CIS 1991
AZ, AM, BY, MD, 
RU, KZ, KG, TJ, 
UZ
RU, BY, UA
Multi-
purpose
Medium 
(1.5)
Medium 
(4.5)
ECO 1992
AF, AZ, IR, PK, 
TR, KZ, KG, TJ, 
TM, UZ
IR, PK, TR
Multi-
purpose
Medium 
(1.5)
Low (3)
IFAS 1993 KZ, KG, TJ, TM, 
UZ
KZ, KG, TJ, TM, 
UZ
Task-specific Low (0) Low (3)
GUAM 1997 AZ, GE, MD, UA AZ, GE, MD, UA Multi-Purpose
Medium 
(1.5)
Low (1)
IGC 
TRACECA 1998
AM, AZ, BG, GE, 
IR, MD, RO, UA, 
TJ, KZ, KG, UZ
AM, AZ, GE, TJ, 
TM, KZ, KG, UZ, 
EU
Task-specific Medium (2)
Medium 
(5.5)
Union 
State 2000 RU, BY RU, BY
Multi-
purpose Medium (2)
Medium 
(4.5)
EurAsEC 2000 RU, BY, KZ, KG, 
TJ
RU, BY, KZ, KG, 
TJ
Multi-
purpose
Medium 
(1.5)
Low (3.5)
SCO 2001 CN, RU, KZ, KG, 
TJ, UZ
CN, RU, KZ, KG, 
TJ
Multi-
purpose
Medium 
(1.5)
Low (3)
CSTO 2002 AM, BY, RU, KZ, 
KG,TJ
AM, RU, KZ, KG, 
TJ, UZ
Task-specific Medium (2) Low (3)
EDB 2006 AM, BY, RU, KZ, 
KG, TJ
RU, KZ Task-specific High (3.5) High (7)
Turkic 
Council 2009 AZ, KG, KZ, TR AZ, KG, KZ, TR
Multi-
purpose Low (0) Low (1)
CU 2010 AM, BY, RU, KG 
KZ
RU, BY, KZ Task-specific
Medium 
(1.5)
Medium (4)
CES 2012 AM, BY, RU, KZ, KG RU, BY, KZ Task-specific
Medium 
(1.5)
High (7)
EAEU 2015 AM, BY, RU, KZ, KG RU, BY, KZ Task-specific Medium (2) High (7)
Source: Own illustration, based on analysis of primary sources.
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The four weakest Eurasian organizations with regard to authority transfers are ECO, IFAS, GUAM, and the 
Turkic Council. It is noteworthy that Russia is not a member of any of these four organizations. When 
comparing the aggregated pooling scores of organizations without Russian membership to scores of orga-
nizations with Russian memberships, the latter score almost three times as high. The same ratio holds true 
for aggregated delegation scores. Even when counting CU, CES, and EAEU as one organization, the scores 
are still double as high. This observation hints at Russia’s central role for regional integration in Eurasia, but 
will be explored more in depth later. 
6.3	A	Closer	Look	at	Eurasian	Regional	Organizations
The most remarkable organizations in terms of institutional design are the EDB and the EAEU, both of which 
display pronounced pooling and delegation. The executive committee of the EDB, which fulfills the role of 
a permanent secretary, is not only tasked to draft the organization’s annual budget, to recruit its own staff, 
and to initiate contacts with other ROs, but also has the right to initiate policies and to carry out executive 
functions, for instance to draft policies and take decisions on issues within its competence. Especially the 
right to initiate and draft policies provides the committee with agenda-setting power. Moreover, the EDB is 
the organization that scores highest with regard to pooling of authority. Decisions in the supreme intergov-
ernmental body, the Council of the Bank, are adopted by supermajority in vital areas, such as constitutional 
amendments or membership accession, and by simple majority in all other decision areas. However, votes 
in the EDB are distributed according to the shares the member states hold in the bank’s capital. Not sur-
prisingly, Russia holds the majority of shares (66 percent) and therefore cannot be outvoted by the other 
member states. The other five members, however, waived their veto and accepted the risk of having to 
adopt decisions that are not in their interest. 
The EAEU developed out of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space, and has an integrated 
market of 183 million people and a GDP of $ 2.2 trillion (EAEU 2016). The idea of creating a Eurasian Union 
already emerged in 1994, but it took 21 years and many treaties more for the idea to fully materialize in 
2015. The institutional design of the EAEU differs from its predecessors in several regards. Decisions in 
the highest intergovernmental organ of the EAEU, the Eurasian Supreme Council, are taken by consen-
sus, meaning that member states preserve their veto. Decisions are binding for all member states and do 
not require ratification. The most remarkable feature of the EAEU is its permanent regulatory organ, the 
Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), which was modelled on the European Commission. 
The EEC disposes of wide reaching competences and can initiate and draft policies, adopt decisions, mon-
itor the implementation of international treaties, frame strategic plans, and even conclude international 
treaties on behalf of the EAEU (Treaty on the EAEU 2014). Most importantly, the ten members of the 
board of the commission take their decisions independent from member states governments’ interests by 
qualified majority, introducing a supranational element to the EAEU. Members of the board are appointed 
for a term of four years. Decisions by the Commission have a directly binding and regulatory effect for all 
member states. It is particularly noteworthy that Russia can now be outvoted by other members as all 
member states are equally represented and have the same amount of votes. Russia’s dominant position in 
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the preceding Commission of the Customs Union was guaranteed by weighted voting, with Russia dispos-
ing of 57 percent of the votes and Belarus and Kazakhstan each having 21,5 percent of the votes. By con-
trast, the rules of the EEC grant every board member and council member one vote. Another institutional 
novelty is the establishment of the Eurasian Court and the creation of a dispute resolution mechanism, 
which enables member states and private parties to appeal against the actions of their business partners 
or decisions taken by EAEU bodies. The EAEU thus disposes of two supranational organs. Interviews with 
officials at the Eurasian Economic Commission in Moscow, which were conducted in February and March 
2017, confirmed that formal rules as defined in the treaty are indeed applied.11 Moreover, my interlocutors 
maintained that Russia was making an effort to observe the rules and recognize the supranational compe-
tencies of the Eurasian Economic Commission.12 
6.4	Phases	of	Eurasian	Regionalism:	From	Shallow	to	Meaningful	Integration
The mapping of regional institutional design in Eurasia in terms of authority transfers, member states, pur-
pose, and policy agenda not only reveals a gradual deepening of regional integration over time, but also 
roughly sketches three phases of regionalism. The first phase begins in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the creation of the CIS and lasts approximately until the end of the nineties. This phase is char-
acterized by ambiguous and wide-reaching integration goals and large membership as almost all former 
Soviet republics participate in regional initiatives. There is cooperation, but no real integration as member 
states remain in full control of regional organizations and decision-making at the regional level. Regional 
cooperation is mainly seen as a way to coordinate reforms and limit the costs of disintegration (Hancock/
Libman 2016). This picture coincides with the general center-periphery understanding of the Yeltsin gov-
ernment. Naturally, Russia took over the permanent seat of the Soviet Union in the UN Security Council 
and assumed most Soviet assets (Curtis 1996). Soon after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the term “near 
abroad” emerged, which referred to the former Soviet republics in a rather diminutive way, distinguishing 
them from the rest of the international community (Safire 1994).
The second phase of Eurasian regionalism starts at the end of the 1990s and largely coincides with Putin’s 
first presidential term. There is a proliferation of rather shallow regional agreements, including regional 
organizations founded by smaller states without Russian participation. Authority transfers to regional or-
ganizations are limited and many agreements are not fully implemented (Hancock/Libman 2016). With the 
creation of the SCO and the CSTO two security organizations emerge in Eurasia. Moreover, the basis for the 
Eurasian Customs Union is established. Especially during this phase, a somewhat fragmented landscape of 
regional organizations with overlapping memberships and agendas evolves. 
11 The list of all interviews conducted in Russia can be found in Annex 3. 
12 Interview with Sergej Shukhno, Moscow, March 7, 2017; interview with Tatjana Valovaya, Moscow, March 16, 
2017; interview with Aleksandr Shamshurin, Moscow, March 21, 2017.
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The third phase, which witnesses real integration, begins in 2006 with the creation of the EDB and culmi-
nates in the establishment of the EAEU in 2015. This phase sees not only greater authority transfers to 
regional organizations and actual implementation of agreements, but also the creation of supranational 
organs. At the same time, this phase is centered on a core of six countries in favor of Eurasian integration: 
Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The focus of cooperation is on economic 
integration. Agreements concluded in this phase represent more advanced “hard-law” integration proj-
ects that bind member states to comprehensive commitments (Delcour 2015: 2; Dragneva 2013: 41). The 
Eurasian Economic Commission, for instance, can issue decisions with direct binding regulatory effect for 
member states. Within its sphere of competence, it can adopt policies independent of national govern-
ments’ interests (Treaty on the EAEU 2014). Furthermore, membership in the CU, the SES, and the EAEU 
is incompatible with EU Free Trade Agreements or membership in the EU, which leads to a de-facto mu-
tual exclusiveness of the EU and Eurasian regional projects and increases the costs of joining Eurasian 
organizations for its members (Delcour 2015, 2016). The third phase sees a rhetoric shift away from the 
term post-Soviet integration to the term Eurasian integration. Eurasia is the new buzzword which is used 
to frame a unique region that functions as a bridge between Europe and Asia, but is based on genuine 
characteristics and values that differ from Asian and European ones. Eurasian integration is mentioned as 
a key strategic priority for Russia for the first time in 2007 in the strategy for long-term social-economic 
development 2020 (RANEPA 2008). 
6.5	The	Eurasian	Puzzle
The results of the empirical analysis are surprising and point to an atypical behavior of both the regional 
hegemon and the smaller Eurasian states. Firstly, all states were formerly part of a single polity, the Soviet 
Union, and ever since its dissolution have been striving for sovereignty, autonomy, and dissociation from 
Russia. Now some of these states have entered deep integration agreements with Russia, which create mu-
tual dependencies and partly reinforce hierarchies and power gaps. Moreover, the evolution of Eurasian 
regionalism differs significantly from other world regions. While it is typically the absence of regional in-
teractions that provides the starting point of regional integration, in Eurasia, it was the collapse of a single 
political entity that kicked off regionalism, driven by the desire “to mitigate the consequences of cutting 
the existing ties” (Libman/Vinokurov 2012: 868). 
Secondly, autocratic states are usually reluctant to conclude deep integration agreements and accept sov-
ereignty restrictions by regional organizations due to the lack of incentives to delegate power and the prob-
lem of credible commitments. Moreover, giving up on the right to veto can limit member states’ room for 
maneuver and opportunities to provide rents to their supporters. Remarkably, the deepening of Eurasian 
regionalism during the past decade coincides with an authoritarian backlash in Russia and an increasingly 
assertive Russian foreign policy under President Putin (Ambrosio 2016; Freedom House 2017b). As au-
tocracy on the domestic level is deepening, Russia increasingly invests in multilateral regional organiza-
tions with intrusive institutional designs. Thirdly, it is surprising that a disproportionately strong regional 
hegemon binds itself to formal rules and gives up sovereignty. Hegemonic stability theory predicts the 
prevalence of intergovernmental arrangements and bilateral agreements in which the hegemon exploits 
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power asymmetries with its neighbors (Krasner 1976; Gilpin 1987; Solingen 2008). Russia, however, seems 
to actively pursue the creation of multilateral organizations with authoritative institutional designs and is 
even willing to accept supranational elements as it has been a founding state of all ROs that score high on 
pooling and delegation.
The paper’s main goal is to provide an overview of regional integration in Eurasia by mapping regional 
organizations and their authority in terms of pooling and delegation. Nevertheless, the next section asks 
why Russia and the smaller Eurasian states decided to transfer more authority to regional organizations 
and give up sovereignty. Potential explanations offered by extant theories of regional cooperation and 
integration are discussed with regard to their explanatory power, paying particular attention to Russia’s 
role as the regional hegemon and agenda setter.
7. Explaining the Increase in Regional Authority: Ruling Elites’ Interests in the Deepening 
of Regional Integration
Russian participation seems to be a crucial driver for the transfer of authority to regional organizations, 
since Russia is a founding member of all organizations that score medium to high on pooling and delega-
tion whereas it does not participate in the organizations with the lowest scores. However, not everything 
can be reduced to Russian hegemony. Several of the smaller post-Soviet states are in favor of Eurasian 
regional integration, too. They are willing to access multilateral organizations with strong delegated bod-
ies and intergovernmental decision-making organs in which they are required to waive their veto. Some 
of these states, for example Kazakhstan and Belarus, even take pro-active stances towards integration, 
voicing their interests and demands firmly. In this regard, the EAEU presents an interesting case as Russia 
agreed to be equal among other member states in the EAEU’s reformed Economic Commission. While 
Russia’s dominant position in the preceding Commission of the Customs Union was guaranteed by a major-
ity of shares and weighted voting, the rules of the new Commission grant all ten commissioners one vote. 
Additionally, weighted voting was abolished. Recent field research in Russia has shown that the reform 
of the Commission was mainly a result of pressure by Kazakhstan and Belarus, who wanted to increase 
their influence vis-à-vis Russia and curtail their neighbor’s dominance in the new organization.13 A compre-
hensive account to explain the deepening of regionalism in Eurasia should therefore not only illuminate 
Russia’s role as the hegemon in the creation and set-up of regional organizations, but also smaller member 
states’ interests and motives to go along with Russian proposals. For reasons of scope, the remainder of 
this paper will largely focus on Russia, proposing to open the black box of the state and study ruling elites’ 
motivations.
Why do we see deeper regional integration from 2006 onwards after 15 years of shallow regionalism? 
Why did the Eurasian states create a regional organization disposing of a supranational commission in 
13 Mentioned in interview with Evgeny Vinokurov, Saint Petersburg, February 22, 2017; interview with Evgeny 
Treshchenkov, Saint Petersburg, February 21 and 28, 2017; interview with Alexander Gabuev, Moscow, March 6, 
2017 and in interview with Konstantin Misherjakov, Saint Petersburg, March 13, 2017.
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which even Russia waives its veto power? Most theories of regional cooperation and integration cannot 
fully account for the deepening of regional integration as the explanatory variables they propose have not 
changed over time in Eurasia (see literature review in Section 2). It is not only the fact that the post-Soviet 
states needed almost two decades and many shallow initiatives to come up with deep regional integra-
tion, but also the existence of a hegemon that is willing to accept sovereignty restrictions in the Eurasian 
Economic Commission, that challenge common explanations. Last but not least, it is difficult to account for 
why authoritarian states access or even create regional organizations that put constraints on their domes-
tic room for maneuver. What many theories have in common is that they understand the state as a unitary 
actor. However, sometimes it can be useful to turn to the second image and study the internal structure 
of states when analyzing international politics (Waltz 1959). I argue that on an empirical level solving the 
Eurasian puzzle requires us to stop treating the state as a unitary actor. Instead, we need to open the 
black box of the state and study ruling elites’ threat perceptions and foreign policy preferences concerning 
regional integration and how they have changed over time. As most Eurasian states are authoritarian or 
hybrid regimes, civil society interests can largely be ignored. Almost all of my interview partners in Russia 
confirmed that Eurasian integration is first and foremost a presidential project, which is conceptualized and 
implemented by the top of the Russian government.14 The same holds true for the other member states 
of the EAEU.
I contend that the deepening of Eurasian regionalism as reflected by increasing authority transfers to re-
gional organizations and the introduction of supranational elements hints at changed threat perceptions 
and foreign policy preferences among ruling elites, which in turn resulted in changed foreign policy strat-
egies. In any given setting, actors prefer some outcomes to others and pursue strategies to achieve their 
most preferred possible outcomes (Frieden 1999: 41). Strategies are tools that actors use to get as close 
to their preferences as possible taking into account their environment, other actors’ strategies, and power 
disparities (Frieden 1999: 41f). There is thus a logical chain: actors constantly observe their environment 
and evaluate their options. When they perceive new threats, their foreign policy preferences adapt to the 
new environment. These altered preferences are then translated into foreign policy strategies. I assume 
that altered threat perceptions, foreign policy preferences and strategies should be reflected in the official 
rhetoric of ruling elites as they alter their narratives accordingly. 
In the 1990s, integration initiatives by Russia were met with public skepticism as a throwback to the Soviet 
regime. In the mid-2000s, closer cooperation with neighboring countries with shared history, language, 
and business culture in the security and economic spheres gathered public support (Kirkham 2016: 116). 
A closer look at official strategies of the Russian government shows that the significance of Eurasian inte-
gration in the official Russian discourse has indeed increased. The term is mentioned for the first time as 
a key strategic priority in 2007 in the strategy for long-term socio-economic development of the Russian 
Federation until 2020 (RANEPA 2008). From then on, it has prominently featured in every official strategy 
concerning foreign policy or socioeconomic development of the Russian government. Several interlocutors 
in Moscow and Saint Petersburg stated that the significance of Eurasian integration in Russian foreign 
policy has steadily amplified over the past years.15 Some connected this development to President Putin’s 
14  See Annex 3 for an overview of all interviews.
15 Interview with Sergej Karaganov, Moscow, February 17, 2017; Interview with Evgeny Vinokurov, Saint Petersburg, 
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third presidential term: “While his first and second presidential terms were largely about domestic reform 
and modernization, the third term is centered on foreign politics, the formation of a genuine Eurasian 
space and decoupling from the West. Eurasian integration provided Putin with a new concept to run his 
campaign on.”16 
The question that immediately emerges is why this change in foreign policy strategy came about. Why did 
Putin need a new concept for his presidential campaign? One way forward is to analyze perceived internal 
and external changes that required ruling elites to change their foreign policy preferences and strategies. 
I assume that there were certain structural incentives that provoked elites to change their foreign policy 
strategies. However, I am mostly interested in how these incentives were perceived and filtered by key 
actors among elites. Whereas a detailed analysis of threat perceptions and foreign policy preferences as 
reflected in official discourses would go beyond the scope of this paper, several Russian experts I talked to 
claimed that it was the increasing influence of both the EU and China in Eurasia that compelled ruling elites 
to change their regional strategy. However, while the EU is mostly perceived as normative threat, China is 
feared because of its economic and demographic strength.17 Regional integration in that regard was seen 
as a means to strengthen Russia’s role in the world and to increase Russian power through pooling capa-
bilities at the regional level.18 
I therefore propose that the reasons for the shift in preferences, motivations, and strategies in Russia can 
best be explained with an altered version of balance of power theory (Waltz 1979; Keohane 1988; Snyder 
1990; Walt 1985, 1987, 1993), focusing on the alliance-building argument. An alliance is a coalition of 
states to accomplish a certain goal – for instance, to counter a common adversary or to pool capabilities 
and power. Usually, an alliance is a response to a threat. When perceiving threats, actors can either counter 
them by internal means, e.g. by investing in their own capabilities, or by external means, e.g. by forming 
alliances (Goldstein 1995). While the classical understanding framed the main purpose of alliances as mili-
tary- or security-related (Snyder 1990; Walt 1987, 1993), contemporary accounts reckon that alliances may 
also serve political, economic, strategic, or ideational interests and motives. However, classic balance-of-
power approaches, just like many other theories, understand the state as a unitary actor. As opposed to 
neo-realists, Barnett (1996) argues that alliances are formed in response to perceived threats. While Walt 
(1987) maintained that the level of threat a state poses to another state is a function of its power, geo-
graphic proximity, military capabilities, and perceived aggressiveness, for Barnett (1996) the perception of 
threats originates from actors’ differing conceptions of identity. Thus, alliances do not form because of dif-
ferences in power, but because of divergent ideas, beliefs, and social constructions among ruling elites. It is 
thus not about objective threats, but rather about how elites perceive and make sense of other states and 
their incumbent governments. Moreover, threats do not necessarily have to be located at the international 
February 22, 2017; Interview with Evgeny Treshchenkov, Saint Petersburg, February 21 and 28, 2017; Interview 
with Alexander Gabuev, Moscow, March 6, 2017; Interview with Andrej Devjatkov, Moscow, March 6, 2017.
16 Interview with Andrej Devjatkov, Moscow, March 6, 2017.
17 Interview with Fyodor Lukyanov, Moscow, February 16, 2017; 2017 Interview with Alexander Gabuev, Moscow, 
March 6, 2017; Interview with Andrej Devjatkov, Moscow, March 6, 2017; Interview with Stanislav Tkachenko, Saint 
Petersburg, March 15, 2017.
18 Interview with Evgeny Treshchenkov, Moscow, February 21 and 28, 2017; Interview with Alexander Gabuev, 
Moscow, March 6, 2017; Interview with Konstantin Misherjakov, Saint Petersburg, March 13, 2017.
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level, they can also be perceived at the regional or even the domestic level. Thus, the argument is that 
there are structural incentives to create alliances. But these incentives are perceived and filtered by ruling 
elites, who alter their foreign policy preferences and strategies and mobilize their resources accordingly, 
including changing or adapting policies and narratives.
Relying on this approach, the EAEU can be understood as a non-traditional means of counter-alliance build-
ing, serving economic and political interests. It is the Russian government’s response to perceived threats, 
which derive from starkly differing ideas about world order and hierarchies as well as social constructions 
of roles. Russians feel increasingly encircled by unfriendly regimes. While the EU is perceived as a norma-
tive threat, China is mostly feared because of its aggressive economic policy and sheer demographics. By 
integrating smaller states into comprehensive regional agreements and by making Eurasian and European 
integration projects mutually exclusive, ruling elites can prevent those states from concluding agreements 
with external actors, such as the EU. Regional organizations in that regard serve as tools to re-unite the 
former Soviet republics under a common institutional architecture, protect them from external influence, 
create new vertical dependencies, and promote a Russian regional blueprint based on the understanding 
of a natural Russian sphere of interests. At the same time, Russia can improve its own position both on the 
regional and the international level by building a more stable region of states that are mutually dependent. 
Especially the Eurasian Economic Union is seen as a tool to create stability through economic growth in 
the region. As a Russian foreign policy expert said: “Russia wanted its own European Union to be taken 
more seriously as the center of gravity in Eurasia. Today you need your own regional bloc to increase your 
bargaining power.”19  
But membership in effective regional organizations can have more side effects. Ambrosio (2016), for in-
stance, argues that Russia purposefully bolsters authoritarianism abroad, as democratic reform and revo-
lution in neighboring countries could endanger its own regime survival. The ability of one country to resist 
democratic pressures by external actors benefits all other autocratic states in the region. Failed transition 
delegitimizes democratization efforts and serves as a warning example for other governments (Ambrosio 
2016). Membership in regional organizations can provide rulers with ideational and material resources to 
stabilize their regimes and ensure their survival (Börzel 2011: 18; Söderbaum 2004, 2010). 
Moreover, the EAEU allows member states to face international partners on more equal terms. By pooling 
their capabilities, member states can exert greater leverage in their bargaining with other states or organi-
zations. Balance of power theory also helps to understand smaller states’ motives for joining regional orga-
nizations. Regional integration allows for bandwagoning as smaller states bind themselves to institutions 
to enhance their power within them and profit from the hegemon’s influence and resources (Waltz 2000; 
Solingen 2008: 263). All member states of the newer Eurasian ROs depend on access to Russian markets as 
well as on Russian resources. Moreover, membership in regional organizations can increase the countries’ 
economic and political weight on international markets (Hancock 2009: 25-29). At the same time, member-
ship in regional organizations allows smaller member states to balance the hegemon and commit it to rules 
and obligations. Exploring the smaller member states’ perspective, however, requires a more in-depth 
analysis of threat perceptions and foreign policy preferences among ruling elites. 
19  Interview with Alexander Gabuev, Moscow, March 6, 2017.
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8. Conclusion and Outlook
The goal of this paper was to analyze the development of regional integration in Eurasia since the break-up 
of the Soviet Union by mapping regional organizations, analyzing their institutional design, and identifying 
patterns of integration. The mapping revealed a general deepening of regionalism over time, reflected 
by increasing authority transfers to newer regional organizations and the creation of supranational or-
gans. Moreover, the implementation of agreements has improved. While regional organizations that were 
created in the 90s and early 2000s display only limited pooling and low to moderate delegation, regional 
organizations that were created after 2005 show pronounced delegation and median to high pooling. 
Overall, three phases of Eurasian regionalism can be distinguished. The first phase lasting from the begin-
ning until the late nineties was characterized by ambiguous and wide-reaching integration goals. Regional 
organizations under full control of member states mainly pursued the goal to coordinate reforms and 
limit the costs of disintegration. The second phase, coinciding with the transition from Yeltsin to Putin and 
Putin’s first presidential term, saw the increase of rather shallow regional agreements. Integration was 
still limited. Finally, there was a significant deepening of integration during the third phase, which began 
in 2006 with the creation of the EDB. Regional organizations created in this phase display both increased 
pooling and delegation and are centered on a core of six countries in favor of Eurasian integration: Russia, 
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Furthermore, agreements in these organizations 
are incompatible with EU Free Trade Agreements or EU membership, increasing the costs of joining them. 
The most remarkable organization is the EAEU, which disposes of two supranational organs and relies upon 
the principle of equality of all members.
The results of the analysis pose a puzzle to scholars of comparative regionalism in several aspects: Firstly, it 
is surprising that the states of the region have concluded deep and consequential integration agreements 
with Russia despite the fact that they have been striving for sovereignty, autonomy, and dissociation from 
their former occupant ever since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Secondly, it is surprising that auto-
cratic states conclude deep integration agreements and actually also implement them, as they limit their 
room for maneuver and opportunities to provide rents to supporters. Moreover, the deepening of Eurasian 
regionalism during the past decade coincides with an authoritarian backlash in Russia and an increasingly 
assertive Russian foreign policy under President Putin. Thirdly, it is surprising that a regional hegemon 
binds itself to formal rules and gives up sovereignty. Russia has been actively pursuing the creation of mul-
tilateral organizations with authoritative institutional designs and has even agreed to supranational bodies.
Since the discussion of potential drivers offered by mainstream theories of regional cooperation and inte-
gration finds that none of the explanations seems to fit the Eurasian context, the paper proposes to open up 
the black box of the state and study ruling elites’ threat perceptions and foreign policy preferences instead. 
This is preliminarily sketched out for the Russian case, taking into consideration that Russian participation 
seems to be crucial for authority transfers to regional organizations in Eurasia. It is argued is that new 
threat perceptions led to an alteration in foreign policy preferences, which in turn resulted in a changed 
foreign policy strategy with regard to regional integration. Those changes should also be reflected in official 
discourses, for instance in speeches, statements, and articles by government officials as well as in official 
strategies of the Russian government, as ruling elites adapted their policies and narratives accordingly. 
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Regional organizations do not represent an end in themselves, but are presumably tools to achieve other 
goals. I therefore propose to apply an altered version of balance of power theory and understand regional 
organizations as alliances, or more precisely, as counter-alliances to counter perceived threats. Russian 
elites feel increasingly encircled by unfriendly states and fear interventions of the European Union and 
China in a region that is considered Russia’s natural sphere of influence. Applying a more constructivist 
stance, I argue that those perceived threats do no result from material factors, such as differences in power, 
but from starkly differing ideas of hierarchy and order, value beliefs and social construction of roles and en-
emies. Over the years, Russian elites have understood that only functioning regional organizations provide 
efficient alliances and have therefore decided to create the EAEU and agreed to give up a certain amount of 
sovereignty for the greater good. Moreover, given Russia’s recent involvement in several conflicts, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan most likely would not have joined the EAEU if Russia had not made any concessions. 
Regional organizations therefore serve political, economic, strategic, and ideational interests and motives. 
Moreover, they allow their member states to pool their capabilities and consequently exert greater lever-
age in their bargaining with other states or organizations. As a member of a recognized regional bloc, it is 
easier to face international partners on equal terms. In that regard, the EAEU from a Russian perspective 
presents the Eurasian counterpart of the EU. Especially in the early phase of the organization, Russia was 
keen to initiate inter-institutional contacts between the EAEU and the EU. At the same time, regional orga-
nizations allow Russia to create closer bonds with the smaller Eurasian states and, by making Eurasian and 
European integration projects mutually exclusive, prevent them from concluding agreements with external 
actors, such as the EU. Regional integration also allows for bandwagoning as less powerful states bind 
themselves to institutions to enhance their power within them and profit from the hegemon’s influence 
and resources. Simultaneously, membership in regional organizations allows smaller member states to 
balance the hegemon and commit it to rules and obligations. A region-internal side effect of regional orga-
nizations is the possibility to stabilize incumbent regimes by preventing democratic reform and revolution 
in neighboring countries and by providing rulers with ideational and material resources. 
A constructivist account of the balance of power theory provides a promising way forward to solve the 
Eurasian puzzle and investigate ruling elites’ motivations and should therefore be pursued in future re-
search. Theoretical parameters should be translated into concrete and observable expectations with re-
gard to changes in official discourses and narratives, followed by a comprehensive analysis of foreign policy 
discourses in Russia, and where applicable, in other member states of the EAEU over the course of the past 
10-15 years. 
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Annex 1: Operationalization of Pooling and Delegation
Authority has been defined as the capacity to make legitimate and binding decisions for a collectivity. My 
empirical analysis of authority transfer relies on an analytical framework and the corresponding coding 
scheme developed by Hooghe, Marks et al. (Hooghe/Marks 2014; Hooghe et al. 2017), which differentiates 
between the two modes of authority transfer, pooling and delegation. Pooling characterizes joint deci-
sion-making among the principals themselves, whereby authority is transferred from individual member 
states to a collective intergovernmental body of the organization (Keohane/Hoffmann 1991: 7). Pooling 
comprises formal rules about joint decision-making procedures, the procedure by which decisions are 
ratified, and the extent to which they are binding (Hooghe/Marks 2014: 307). Delegation describes a condi-
tional grant of authority by member states to an independent body of the organization, such as the general 
secretariat, enabling it to fill in or decide about the practical details of incomplete contracts and to perform 
certain limited tasks (Kahler/Lake 2009: 246; Hooghe/Marks 2014: 309). Delegation helps to reduce the 
transaction costs of decision-making, provide information to all member states, avoid issue cycling, and 
sustain credible commitments (Hooghe/Marks 2014: 309f). Regional organizations are conceived as del-
egated bodies under member states’ control, whose autonomy can differ across organizations and over 
time. The following coding scheme is taken from Hooghe et al. (Hooghe/Marks 2014; Hooghe et al. 2017). 
Changes to the scheme are indicated.
Operationalizing	Pooling
Pooling refers to the transfer of authority from member states to a collective body of the RO in which mem-
ber states directly participate, but which they do not individually control. Pooling of authority is measured 
in the highest intergovernmental body with regard to voting rules, ratification procedures, and bindingness 
of decisions at the stage of final decision-making. I evaluate whether decision rules depart from unanimity 
to some form of majoritarianism, whether the decision requires ratification, and whether the decision is 
binding. The measure consists of four elements: composition of the highest RO body, voting rule, binding 
character of the decision, and ratification rules. Regarding the operationalization of pooling, I use Hooghe 
et al.’s model.
1. Composition: Pooling pertains to assemblies or executive organs that are fully or primarily composed 
of member state representatives.
2. Voting rule: Voting rule captures the formal rule by which decisions are taken in the highest inter-
governmental body. Decision rules are coded from 0 to 1, with consensus, unanimity, no voting rule 
= 0; supermajority (e.g. two-thirds majority) = 0.5; simple or absolute majority20 = 1. Technocratic 
decision rules receive an intermediate code.
20 While simple majority means a decision passes when the majority of those states that cast a vote voted 
in favor, absolute majority means a decision passes when the majority of all states that are eligible to 
vote voted in favor. Simple majority disregards absences and votes to abstain, absolute majority does not.
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3. Bindingness: Bindingness measures whether decisions are nonbinding, partially binding, or binding. 
Decisions are coded from 0 to 1, with nonbinding decisions = 0, partly binding decisions = 0.5, and 
binding decisions = 1. A decision is nonbinding if there is a voluntary provision or if objections by one 
or several countries postpone or annul the decision. A decision is partly binding if an individual mem-
ber state can opt out or postpone a decision without affecting the binding character for other member 
states. A decision is binding if there is a formal legal provision to this effect or if there is no provision 
for a member state to opt out or postpone implementation of a decision.
4. Ratification. Ratification measures whether decisions have to be ratified to come into effect. There 
are three possibilities: a) the decision comes into force for all states if ratified by all, or comes into 
force only for those member states that ratify (coded as 0); b) the decision comes into force for all 
states after ratification by a subset of states (coded as 0.5); c) the decision comes into force without 
ratification (coded as 1).
Pooling is calculated as a summated score of the voting rule, bindingness, and ratification. As sovereignty 
loss is biggest when member states waive their veto right by agreeing to majority voting and accepting 
the risk of being outvoted by others, the score for voting rules counts double and is thus multiplied by two, 
while the scores for bindingness and ratification are just counted once. The maximum score of 4 can thus 
be reached when regional organizations take binding decisions that do not require ratification by majority 
voting. The minimum score (0) is reached when a regional organization takes nonbinding decisions that 
have to be ratified by all member states by unanimity. Intermediate scores such as 1.5 or 2.5 are also 
possible since provisions such as supermajority voting of partly binding decisions yield half points. Pooling 
scores are first calculated for each domain and summated on a scale from 0 (no pooling) to 4 (maximum 
pooling) and then transformed into qualitative indicators, indicating high, medium, and low levels of pool-
ing. Scores from 0 to 1 translate to low, scores from 1.5 to 2.5 translate to medium, and scores from 3 to 4 
translate to high levels of pooling.  
Operationalizing	Delegation
Delegation	measures authority transfers by member states to independent bodies of regional organiza-
tions, such as general secretariats, executive committees, non-state assemblies, consultative bodies, and 
judicial bodies. Delegated bodies are primarily or wholly composed of non-member state representatives. 
Delegation is an additive index that measures delegated bodies’ competencies in agenda-setting, deci-
sion-making, and adjudication. In this paper, delegation is only evaluated in general secretariats and exec-
utive bodies fulfilling the function of a secretariat.
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Delegation	to	the	general	secretariat
Hooghe, Marks et al. (2014, 2017) assess delegated bodies’ competencies in the following six decision 
areas: accession, suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial non-compliance, and 
policy-making. After having gone through the treaties of Eurasian regional organizations, I decided to revise 
the operationalization of this measure and made the following changes: 1) I merged the domains “member-
ship accession” and “suspension” as they are mostly covered in the same paragraph in the treaties and the 
competencies of delegated bodies do not differ. 2) I account for whether regional organizations dispose of 
a permanent secretariat that performs infrastructural and administrative services, as this is the first step of 
delegation. In fact, not all regional organizations dispose of a permanent secretariat – instead, member states 
sometimes take care of secretarial tasks on a rotating basis. 3) I merged the domains “substantive non-com-
pliance” and “financial non-compliance” as those two issues are usually treated within the same paragraph. 
4) I added the following two decision areas: human resource management (appointment of staff) and initia-
tion of cooperation with other international organizations. These task domains have not been covered by any 
of the domains in Hooghe et al.’s model. A general secretariat is usually not a final decision-maker, so the cod-
ing assesses to which extent the secretariat can go beyond infrastructural functions to act as an agenda setter.
1. Existence	of	a	secretariat	that	performs	basic	infrastructural	services: Does the RO dispose of a sec-
retariat that is authorized to deliver infrastructural services such as running the RO’s headquarters, 
organizing meetings, and maintaining records?
2. Membership	accession	and	suspension: Is the secretariat authorized to vet, solicit, negotiate, or to 
suspend membership of the RO (0, 1)?
3. Constitutional	 amendments: Is the secretariat authorized to initiate or negotiate constitutional 
amendments (0, 1)?
4. Non-compliance: Is the secretariat authorized to initiate a formal proceeding against a member state 
in case of non-compliance with rules or decisions of the RO or in financial arrears (0, 1)?
5. Drafting	the	budget. Is the secretariat authorized to (co-)draft the annual budget of the RO (0, 1)?
6. Policy	initiation: Is the secretariat authorized to propose one or more of the following: recommenda-
tions, resolutions, or declarations; programs or projects; laws, regulations, decisions, or directives; 
protocols or conventions (0, 1)?
7. Monopoly	of	policy	initiation: Is the role of the secretariat in initiating policies a) not mandated, b) 
mandated by the RO’s treaties but shared with other bodies, or c) anchored in the RO’s treaties and 
exclusive (0, 0.5, 1)?
8. Executive	powers: Is the secretariat authorized to carry out executive functions, such as framing multi-
year strategic plans, drafting policy, or turning general legislation into directives or executive orders (0, 1)?
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9. Monopoly	of	executive	powers: Is the role of the secretariat in carrying out executive functions a) not 
mandated, b) mandated by the RO’s treaties but shared with other bodies, or c) anchored in the RO’s 
treaties and exclusive (0, 0.5, 1)?
10. Staff	recruitment/management: Is the secretariat authorized to recruit staff or higher experts and 
consultants (0, 1)?
11. Initiation	and	maintenance	of	cooperation	with	other	IOs: Is the secretariat authorized to initiate and 
maintain communication and cooperate with other international organizations?
Delegation to general secretariats is first calculated as a summated rating scale ranging from 0 (no delega-
tion) to 11 (maximum delegation). The numeric indicators are then transformed to qualitative indicators, 
indicating high, medium, or low levels of delegation. Scores from 0 to 3 translate to low, scores from 4 to 6 
translate to medium, and scores from 7 to 11 translate to high levels of delegation. 
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Annex 2: Overview of all Regional Organizations in Eurasia
Name of organization
Year of 
Establishment
Member States Issue areas
Eurasian / Post-Soviet Organizations
Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS)
1991
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Moldova, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan
Economy, security, political 
affairs
Union State of Russia and 
Belarus
1996 Belarus, Russia
Economy, political affairs, 
security, culture
Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEC)
2000 - 2014
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia, Tajikistan 
Economy, trade
Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO)
2001
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Russia, Uzbekistan
Mainly security + trade, 
border management, politics, 
tourism, technology, etc.
Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO)
2002
Armenia, Belarus, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan 
Security
Eurasian Development Bank 
(EDB)
2006
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan
Finance, research on regional 
integration
Eurasian Customs Union 
(CU) 
2010 
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia
Economy
CIS Free Trade Area 2011
Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Russia, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan
Trade
Common Economic Space 
(CES)
2012
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia
Economy
Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU)
2015 
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia
Economy, transport, energy, 
agriculture
Eurasian organization created to promote integration without Russia
GUAM Organization for 
Democracy and Economic 
Development
1997 (2001, 
2006)
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, 
Ukraine (Uzbekistan 1999-2002)
Security, economy, energy, 
democracy promotion, 
European integration
Central Asian organizations
International Fund for 
Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) 1993
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan
Environment, water 
management
Central Asian Nuclear 
Weapon Free Zone 
(CANWFZ)
2006
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan
Nonproliferation
Central Asian Regional 
Economic Cooperation 
Program (CAREC)
1997
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, 
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan + 6 IOs
Economy, trade, transport, 
energy
Special Program for the 
Economies of Central Asia 
(SPECA)
1998
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan 
Economy, transport, energy
Turkic Council 2009
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkey
Economy, culture
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Black Sea Organizations
Organization of the Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation 
(BSEC)
1992
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, 
Moldova, Romania, Russia, 
Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine
Economy, culture
Black Sea Environment 
Program (BSEP) or Black Sea 
Commission (BSC)
1992
Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, 
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine
Environment
Black Sea Trade and 
Development Bank
1999
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, 
Moldova, Romania, Russia, 
Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine
Finance
Black Sea Naval 
Cooperation Task Group 
(BlackSeaFor)
2001
Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, 
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine
Security, humanitarian 
interventions
European Organizations
Intergovernmental 
Commission Transport 
Corridor Europe-Caucasus-
Asia (IGC TRACECA)
1993
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, 
Georgia, Iran, Moldova, Romania, 
Turkey, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan
Economy, transport
Interstate Oil and Gas 
Transportation to Europe 
(INOGATE)
1996
EU + Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan
Energy
Border Management in 
Central Asia (BOMCA)
2003
Border management program of 
EU and UNDP to assist 5 Central 
Asian countries
Security
Central Asia Drug Action 
Program (CADAP)
2000
EU program to assist 5 Central 
Asian countries
Security
West and South Asian Organizations
Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO) 1985
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, 
Pakistan, Turkey, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
Economic
Conference on Interaction 
and Confidence-building 
Measures in Asia (CICA)
1999
26 members including 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan
Security, political affairs
The Asia Cooperation 
Dialogue (ACD) 2002
33 members including 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
Trade, infrastructure, energy, 
tourism etc.
UN Programs
United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
1997 
Regional offices in Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
Security
United Nations Regional 
Center for Preventive 
Diplomacy for Central Asia 
(UNRCCA)
2007
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan
Security, environment
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Annex 3: List of interviews conducted in Russia
During my fieldwork in Russia from February 15 until March 31, 2017, I was hosted by the School of 
International Relations at the Saint Petersburg State University, to which I am very thankful. I conducted 
18 interviews in both Saint Petersburg and Moscow with foreign policy experts, advisors, bureaucrats, and 
staff at regional organizations. The interviews were conducted in Russian, English, and German, depending 
on my interlocutor’s preference. I met 16 interlocutors for personal interviews. With two interlocutors 
I talked as a participant of the “Meeting Russia” Public Diplomacy Program of PICREADI (Center for the 
Support and Development of Public Initiatives Creative	Diplomacy) at the beginning of February 2017. 
These two encounters were not one-on-one meetings, but group discussions. 
Number Name Position Place/ Date/ Interview Language
1 Fyodor Lukyanov Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global 
Affairs, Chairman of the Presidium 
of the Council on Foreign and 
Defense Policy, Research Director of 
the Valdai International Discussion 
Club
Office of Russia Beyond the Headlines, 
Moscow / 16.02.17
Group Talk within the framework of 
the Meeting Russia Public Diplomacy 
Program
2 Sergej Karaganov Foreign Policy Advisor of the 
Russian Government, Dean at 
Faculty of World Economy and 
International Affairs, Higher School 
of Economics
HSE Moscow / 17.02.17
Group Talk within the framework of 
the Meeting Russia Public Diplomacy 
Program
3 Evgeny Vinokurov Director of the Centre for 
Integration Studies, Eurasian 
Development Bank
Centre for Integration Studies (EDB) 
Saint Petersburg / 22.02.17
Interview in English
4 Evgeny Treshchenkov Associate Professor at the School 
of International Relations / Saint 
Petersburg State University
School of International Relations / 
21.02.17 and 28.02.17
Interview in English
5 Ekaterina Romanova Project Coordinator at Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation Moscow
Konrad Adenauer Foundation Moscow 
/ 06.03.17
6 Alexander Gabuev Senior Associate and Chair Russia 
in the Asia-Pacific Program of the 
Carnegie Moscow Center
Carnegie Center Moscow / 06.03.17
Interview in English
7 Andrej Devyatkov Senior Expert Center for Strategic 
Research Moscow, Senior Fellow at 
Institute for Economy, Lomonosov 
University
Moscow / 06.03.17
Interview in German
8 Sergej Shukhno Director of the Integration 
Development Department of the 
Eurasian Economic Commission
Eurasian Economic Commission / 
07.03.17
9 German Embassy 
Moscow
Background Talk, no quotes allowed German Embassy Moscow / 
07.03.17
Interview in German
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10 Jurij Kofner Founder and director of the Center 
for Eurasian Studies and the Center 
for Continental Cooperation, Head 
of the Eurasian Movement of the 
Russian Federation
Café in Moscow / 08.03.17
Interview in German
11 Maria Lagutina Associate Professor at the School 
of International Relations, Saint 
Petersburg State University
Saint Petersburg State University / 
13.03.17
Interview in Russian
12 Dmitrij Baryshnykov Professor at the School of 
International Relations, Saint 
Petersburg State University,
Expert at the Inter-Parliamentary 
Assembly of CIS
Saint Petersburg State University / 
13.03.17
Interview in Russian
13 Konstantin 
Misherjakov
Professor for International Relations 
in the post-Soviet Space at the 
School of International Relations, 
Saint Petersburg State University 
Saint Petersburg State University, 
13.03.17
Interview in Russian
14 Stanislav Tkachenko Professor at the Faculty of Political 
Science, Saint Petersburg State 
University and Advisor to the Inter-
Parliamentary Assembly of CIS
Saint Petersburg State University / 
15.03.17
Interview in Russian
15 Tatjana Valovaya Member of the Board of the 
Eurasian Economic Commission 
- Minister of Integration and 
Macroeconomics (Russian 
Federation)
Eurasian Economic Commission / 
16.03.17
Interview in English
16 Daria Ushkalova Lecturer at the Moscow School 
of Economics, Head of the Center 
for International Macroeconomics 
and Foreign Economic Relations, 
Institute of Economics, Russian 
Academy of Science
Moscow School of Economics, 
Moscow State University / 17.03.17
Interview in Russian
17 Dmitrij Kononenko Division Manager Digitalization and 
Future Technologies, Relations with 
the Eurasian Economic Union
German-Russian Chamber of 
Commerce / 20.03.17
Interview in German
18 Aleksandr Shamshurin Third Secretary at the First CIS 
Department (1CISD), Foreign 
Ministry of the Russian Federation
Russian MFA / 21.03.17
Interview in Russian
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe - Encouraging Academic Exchange and 
Intensive Research
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) is a funding program launched by 
the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft - DFG) in 2008. As a Research College, it is intended to provi-
de a scientifically stimulating environment for innovative research 
within a small group of senior and junior researchers. 
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe „The Transformative Power of Europe“ in-
vestigates how ideas spread across time and space. During its first 
phase of research, from 2008-2012, the KFG studied the diffusion 
of policy ideas and institutions within the European Union (EU), its 
candidates and neighborhood. During the second phase, from 2012-
2016, the KFG realigns its focus of interest on the diffusion of ideas, 
policies, and institutions beyond Europe (comparative regionalism) 
and the analysis of the EU at the receiving end of external influences. 
Its two main research areas are:
• The EU and Regional Institutions in Latin America, Africa, 
 the Middle East and Asia
• Europe and the EU and Recipients of Diffusion
